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Halistrom v. Tillamook County: Interpreting
The Notice Provisions of Environmental
Statutes
Karen P. Ryan
Notice requirements of citizen suit provisions in en-
vironmental statutes require that notice of an intention
to bring a lawsuit for violation of an environmental stat-
ute be given at least sixty. days prior to the filing of an
action. Notice of such an intention must be given to the
Environmental Protection Agency, the state in which the
violation occurred, and the alleged violator. In Hallstrom
v. Tillamook County, the Supreme Court held that the
notice requirements for citizen suit provisions of envi-
ronmental statutes must be strictly interpreted. Accord-
ing to the author, this decision exalts form over sub-
stance and does nothing to further the purpose of
providing for citizen suits. This Note examines the Hall-
strom decision and purposes behind notice provisions.
The author concludes that these provisions should be
pragmatically interpreted, providing courts with the dis-
cretion to modify or waive the notice requirements for a
citizen suit depending on the individual circumstances
of an individual case.
I. Introduction
In Halistrom v. Tillamook County,' the United States
Supreme Court established that the notice requirements for
citizen suits, brought under federal environmental statutes,
require strict compliance.2 Failure to provide notice can result
in the dismissal of an action. The Hallstrom decision treats
1. 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989).
2. Id.
255
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notice provisions of environmental statutes as inflexible juris-
dictional barriers and overlooks Congress' stated purpose of
encouraging citizen enforcement of environmental statutes.
The decision deprives courts of the discretion to expedite pro-
ceedings, while providing polluters with the defense of a juris-
dictional objection.
Halistrom presented the Court with the issue of whether
the sixty-day notice requirement for a citizen suit filed under
section 7002 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act'
(RCRA) is jurisdictional or pragmatic." A jurisdictional inter-
pretation of the notice provision requires that the action be
dismissed for failure to comply. A pragmatic interpretation al-
lows the notice provision to be subject to waiver, equitable
modification, and cure. In Hallstrom, the Court adopted a ju-
risdictional approach finding that the citizen-plaintiff's failure
to comply with the sixty-day notice requirement deprived the
district court of jurisdiction to hear the case.5
Section II of this Note explores the issue of strict compli-
ance with the notice provisions of federal environmental stat-
utes. It includes an examination of the applicable provisions
of RCRA, and a description of the two approaches for inter-
preting the notice provisions in similar federal environmental
statutes. Section III provides an explanation and analysis of
the facts and holdings in Halistrom. Section IV concludes
that the notice requirements of RCRA and similar environ-
mental statutes should be interpreted pragmatically, subject
to waiver, equitable modification, and cure.
II. Background
A. RCRA's Notice Requirements
The subsections of the notice requirements of section
7002 of RCRA provide, in relevant part:
3. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988).
4. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. 304, 306 (1989). On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court framed the issue as whether compliance with the sixty-day notice provision is a
mandatory precondition to suit or whether it can be disregarded by the district court
at its discretion. Id.
5. Id.
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§ 6972. Citizens' suits
(a) In general
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this
section, any person may commence a civil action on his
own behalf-
(1)(A) against any person ... who is alleged to
be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which
has become effective pursuant to this chapter; or
(B) against any person . . . who is contributing
to the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste which may present an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment to the health or the environment;
or
Any action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall
be brought in the district court for the district in which
the alleged violation occurred .... The district court shall
have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in contro-
versy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce the per-
mit ....
(b) Actions prohibited
(1) No action may be commenced under subsection
(a)(1)(A) of this section-
(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given
notice of the violation to-
(i) the Administrator;
(ii) the State in which the alleged violation oc-
curs; and
(iii) to any alleged violator of such permit, stan-
dard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibi-
tion, or order,
except that such action may be brought imme-
diately after such notification in the case of an ac-
tion under this section respecting a violation of sub-
chapter III of this chapter; or
(B) if the Administrator or State has com-
menced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or crimi-
1990]
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nal action in a court of the United States or a State
to require compliance with such permit, standard,
regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or
order.
RCRA's notice provision is substantially similar to the
citizen-suit notice provisions in other federal environmental
statutes.' Subsection (a) provides for the enforcement of
RCRA violations by citizens and expressly grants district
courts subject matter jurisdiction over such actions.8 In order
to establish jurisdiction over a citizen suit in the district
court, the citizen-plaintiff must make a good faith allegation
of a continuous or intermittent violation2
Subsection (b)(1) requires the citizen-plaintiff to give no-
tice of the alleged RCRA violation to the EPA Administrator,
the state, and the alleged violators sixty days before com-
mencing the action.10 This means that once a citizen has noti-
fied the necessary parties, sixty days must lapse before the
action can begin. Through the 1984 amendments to RCRA,
Congress established that an action may commence immedi-
ately after notification has been given to the violator when the
violation concerns RCRA hazardous waste management
6. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988).
7. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 307. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act §
505 (a), (b), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), (b) (1988); Clean Air Act § 304 (a), (b), 42 U.S.C. §
7604(a), (b) (1988); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 § 105
(g)(1), (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1), (2) (1988); Noise Control Act of 1972 § 12 (a), (b),
42 U.S.C. § 4911(a), (b) (1988); Deepwater Port Act of 1974 § 16 (a), (b), 33 U.S.C. §
1515 (a), (b) (1988); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449 (a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a),
(b) (1988); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520 (a), (b), 30
U.S.C. § 1270(a), (b) (1988); Toxic Substances Control Act § 20 (a), (b), 15 U.S.C. §
2619(a), (b) (1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act § 310 (a)-(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)-(d) (1988); Endangered Species Act of
1973 § 11(g) (1), (2), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1), (2) (1988); Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act § 23(a)(1), (2), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(1), (2) (1988); Act to Prevent Pollution
from Ships § 11 (a), (b), 33 U.S.C. § 1910(a), (b) (1988); Consumer Product Safety
Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988).
9. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 64
(1987) (discussing the citizen suit provision of section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365 (1988)).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (1988).
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standards.1
Notice to a violator provides the violator with an oppor-
tunity to comply with the statute before legal action is taken
against him.1" Notice to the Administrator and the state is
designed to trigger government action in resolving the
matter.1
Congress has provided for citizen suits to assist the gov-
ernment in the enforcement of environmental statutes. As
part of a congressional debate over citizen suits, Senator Mus-
kie stated:
Citizens in bringing such actions are performing a
public service. The limited resources of many State en-
forcement agencies, bearing the first line of responsibility
under this bill, will be fully extended. [The citizen suit]
provision, requiring.., notice to State and Federal agen-
cies, in which they may initiate abatement proceedings,
will allow many violations to come to their attention
which might otherwise escape notice."
Citizen suits are barred if the government has com-
menced, and is diligently prosecuting, an action in court to
compel the violator to comply. 3 When the government re-
ceives notice of a violation of an environmental statute, it may
bring an action, but it is not compelled to do so.1 6 Senator
Muskie also remarked, "[B]efore any citizen can bring an ac-
.11. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 401,
98 Stat. 3221, 3270 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (1988)).
12. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 310 (1989).
13. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 110
S. Ct. 304, 311 (1989). The Senate Committee Report on the Clean Air Act stated, "In
order to further encourage and provide for agency enforcement, the Committee has
added a requirement that prior to filing a petition with the court, a citizen ... would
first have to serve notice of intent to file such action on the Federal and State air
pollution control agency and the alleged polluter." SENATE COMM. REPORT ON THE
CLEAN AIR AcT, S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970).
14. 116 CONG. REc. S33,103 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970) (memorandum by Sen.
Muskie).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2) (1988).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1) (1988). See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct.
304, 311 (1989).
1990]
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tion, he is required to notify the enforcement agency con-
cerned of his intent. . . . [TIhe idea is to use citizens to trigger
the enforcement mechanism. If that enforcement mechanism
does not respond, then the citizen has [the] right to go to
court."' 17 Though Congress intended the notice requirements
to trigger government action, they were not meant to discour-
age citizen suits. Notice requirements serve to provide the
government and the violator with the information necessary
to give a clear indication of the citizen's intent.
B. Two Approaches for Interpreting Notice Requirements
for Citizen Suits
Eight circuit courts have addressed the issue of whether
the citizen suit notice requirements in federal environmental
statutes require jurisdictional or pragmatical interpretation.
The circuits are evenly divided regarding the proper
approach.
1. The Jurisdictional Approach
The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts have
determined that compliance with the notice provisions of fed-
eral environmental statutes is a jurisdictional prerequisite for
a district court to hear the case."
In Garcia v. Cecos International, Inc.,' 9 the First Circuit
found that "failure to provide actual notice to the EPA, the
state and the alleged violator at least sixty days before the
commencement of the action forecloses the possibility of juris-
diction under RCRA."20 In that case, a group of citizens
brought an action in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico to
prevent the construction and operation of a waste disposal fa-
cility.2 1 The defendant, who managed the facility, successfully
removed the case to federal court, and the plaintiffs amended
17. 116 CONG. REC. S33,103 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
18. See infra notes 19, 27, 35, 42.
19. 761 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1985).
20. Id. at 83.
21. Id. at 78.
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their complaint to include allegations of RCRA .violations.2 2
The First Circuit dismissed this cause of action for lack of
federal jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to
follow the procedures required for citizen suits under RCRA.2 3
The court stated, "The notice requirement is not a technical
wrinkle or superfluous formality that federal courts may waive
at will. We believe that it is part of the jurisdictional conferral
from Congress that cannot be altered by the courts. '24 The
First Circuit also cited several policy reasons for requiring
strict compliance with the notice requirements of RCRA.23
The court stated that the notice provided by the potential
plaintiff gives the EPA and the state a chance to investigate,
facilitates extrajudicial settlement of disputes, and helps to
prevent the potential plaintiff and the alleged violator from
immediately taking adversarial positions."
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in a case
which involved the notice requirements for citizen suit provi-
sions in RCRA and the Clean Water Act (CWA). In Walls v.
Waste Resource Corp. ,2' 7 the Sixth Circuit found that compli-
ance with the sixty-day notice provisions of RCRA and the
CWA was a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a citizen
suit under these statutes." The citizen-plaintiffs alleged viola-
tions of RCRA and the CWA and brought a class action on
behalf of everyone doing business or residing near the
Bumpass Cove landfill. Plaintiffs based jurisdiction on the
citizen suit provisions in these statutes.30 The action was re-
manded for dismissal. The Sixth Circuit found that the dis-
trict court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case
due to the plaintiffs' failure to comply with the notice require-
ments of RCRA and the CWA.3 1 Basing its decision on a lit-
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 79.
25. Id. at 81-82.
26. Id.
27. 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985).
28. Id. at 317.
29. Id. at 314.
30. Id.
31. Id.
1990]
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eral construction and the legislative history of the statutes,
the court found that the notice requirements are not mere for-
malities, but a means of reducing litigation.32 It was insignifi-
cant to the court that the state had been aware of the viola-
tions occurring for more than sixty days before the action was
filed by the citizen-plaintiffs.33 The court required instead
that formal notice be given by the plaintiffs in strict compli-
ance with the notice provisions. 4
In City of Highland Park v. Train," the Seventh Circuit
decided that the notice requirements of the Clean Air Act
(CAA) 6 should also be interpreted jurisdictionally. 7 The
plaintiffs in Highland Park brought an action to prevent the
construction of a shopping center, alleging that its construc-
tion would violate the CAA by creating an overwhelming
amount of traffic." The Seventh Circuit found that the plain-
tiffs' failure to give the Administrator of the EPA notice of
the violation sixty days prior to filing suit was fatal to the
plaintiffs' assertions under the citizen-suit provision.89 The
court found that the legislative history of citizen-suit provi-
sions demonstrates that Congress intended that they be used
in a manner least likely to "clog" the courts. Congress pre-
ferred the use of governmental action as a substitute for the
citizen suit in most cases. 0
2. The Pragmatic Approach
The Second, Third, Eighth, and District of Columbia Cir-
cuits have found that the notice requirements for citizen suits
in federal environmental statutes should be interpreted
32. Id. at 316-17.
33. Id. at 317.
34. Id.
35. 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975).
36. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1706 (1970)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), (b) (1988)).
37. See 519 F.2d 681.
38. Id. at 684.
39. Id. at 690-91.
40. Id.
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pragmatically,"1 allowing for waiver, equitable modification,
and cure.42
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway,4 s the
Second Circuit found that the district court had jurisdiction
to hear the case even though the plaintiffs gave notice to the
EPA and other interested parties less than sixty days before
commencing the action.44 The citizen-plaintiffs in Callaway
brought an action under the CWA against the United States
Navy to prevent further dumping of polluted dredged soil into
the Long Island Sound.4' The plaintiffs gave notice of their
action to the EPA and other interested parties on July 15,
1974 and filed the action on September 3, 1974, less than sixty
days later.4" The Second Circuit found that the citizen-suit
provision "is not the exclusive jurisdictional basis for suit
under [the CWA] and that jurisdiction of claimed violations
of [the CWA] can exist under either the general federal ques-
tion statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 [1988] or the Administrative
Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 [19881. ' '  In a similar case,
the Second Circuit found that by including citizen suit provi-
sions in section 304 of the Clean Air Act,48 "Congress made
[it] clear that citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances
or troublemakers but rather as welcomed participants in the
vindication of environmental interests. '4 e
The Third Circuit also found that the plaintiff's failure to
comply with the notice requirements of the CWA did not de-
prive the district court of jurisdiction to hear the case.50 The
41. See infra notes 43, 51, 58, 62, 65. Courts have used the terms "pragmatically"
and "procedurally" interchangeably to describe an interpretation of notice require-
ments. This interpretation provides a district court with the flexibility to stay an
action or allow an action to proceed even though a citizen-plaintiff has failed to spe-
cifically comply with the notice requirements.
42. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 110
S. Ct. 304 (1989).
43. 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975).
44. Id. at 83-84.
45. Id. at 82.
46. Id. at 83.
47. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988).
49. Friends of the Earthv. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976).
50. Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens for a Hygienic Env't v. Eaton, 644 F.2d
1990]
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citizen-plaintiff in Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens for a
Hygienic Environment v. Eaton" brought an action against
various defendants alleging a sewage leak into the Shenango
River in violation of the CWA.52 The citizen-plaintiff failed to
give notice to the EPA, the state, and the alleged violators
sixty days prior to commencing the suit.53 The Third Circuit
followed the pragmatic approach regarding the notice require-
ments." The court found that "requir[ing] 'dismissal and re-
filing of premature suits would be excessively formalistic.' Re-
quiring such a procedure after proceeding to the stage of the
case presently before us would also waste judicial resources..
- [and] would frustrate citizen enforcement of the Act."' 55 The
Third Circuit determined that the plaintiff's failure to meet
the notification requirements under the CWA was properly
cured when the district court stayed the proceedings.56 The
stay provided time for the appropriate parties to receive noti-
fication and take the necessary steps to rectify the violation. 7
In Proffitt v. Commissioners, Township of Bristol," the
Third Circuit reaffirmed its pragmatic approach regarding no-
tice requirements for citizen suits.59 The court stated that
"the sixty-day notice provisions should be applied flexibly to
avoid hindrance of citizen suits through excessive formal-
ism."60 The Third Circuit also found that the notice require-
ment is satisfied upon "a showing that the defendants and ad-
ministrative agencies had actual notice of the alleged
violations more than sixty days before the suit was filed."61
995, 996 (3d Cir. 1981).
51. 644 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1981).
52. Id. at 996.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 997.
57. Id.
58. 754 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1985).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 506.
61. Id. (quoting Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island, 619 F.2d 231
(3d Cir. 1980)). In Susquehanna, the Third Circuit found that even though the citi-
zen-plaintiffs filed suit under the CWA only two days after giving notice to the rele-
vant agencies, dismissal and refiling was not necessary where it appeared that the
[Vol. 8
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The pragmatic or procedural approach has also been
adopted by the Eighth Circuit. In Hempstead County and
Nevada County Project v. EPA,62 the Eighth Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of whether a grant of interim status by the
EPA to the operator of a proposed hazardous waste landfill
disposal facility was appropriate.6 3 While the court found that
it did not have the jurisdiction to review such a determination
by the EPA, it noted that the failure by the citizen-plaintiffs
to specifically comply with the notice requirement under
RCRA did not require dismissal of the case since the purpose
of the notice was satisfied."
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia also
subscribed to the pragmatic approach regarding notice re-
quirements for citizen suits. The view of the D.C. Circuit is
exemplified in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Train.6 In Train, the citizen-plaintiff sought to compel the
EPA to publish effluent limitation guidelines as mandated by
the CWA 6 The court found that the failure by the citizen-
plaintiff to give notice sixty days prior to commencing the ac-
tion was not fatal to the district court's jurisdiction. The
court's finding was based on a comparison between the citi-
zen-suit provisions in the CWA and those in the CAA.67 The
court found that by enacting the citizen suit provisions in the
CAA, Congress sought to permit any citizen to bring an action
directly against polluters violating performance standards and
emission restrictions. 8 The court stated: -
The notice requirement was intended to 'further en-
courage and provide for agency enforcement' that might
obviate the need to resort to the courts.
* * ' The legislative history of the Clean Air Act
Amendments reveals that the citizen suit provision re-
agency had notice of the violation for more than sixty days. 619 F.2d at 243.
62. 700 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1983).
63. Id. at 461.
64. Id. at 463.
65. 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
66. Id. at 695.
67. Id. at 699.
68. Id. at 700.
1990]
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flected a deliberate choice by Congress to widen citizen
access to the courts, as a supplemental and effective as-
surance that the Act would be implemented and
enforced."
III. The Case
A. The Facts
Olaf and Mary Hallstrom owned and resided on a dairy
farm next to the Tillamook County sanitary landfill.70 Before
April 1981, the Hallstroms became concerned that leachate
(contaminated liquid) was being discharged from the landfill
and causing chemical and bacterial pollution of their surface
and groundwater. 71 In April 1981, the Hallstroms mailed for-
mal written notice to Tillamook County claiming that its op-
eration of the landfill was in violation of RCRA. The Hall-
stroms also stated their intention to file a suit.72 The
Hallstroms did not send a copy of the formal notice to the
Administrator of the EPA or to Oregon's Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality (DEQ).73
Counsel for the Hallstroms claimed that the DEQ had ac-
tual knowledge of the violations by the County for at least a
year and a half before the suit was filed. 4 According to a
chronology of events prepared by the DEQ, it seems evident
that the DEQ was aware of RCRA violations committed by
the County in operating the landfill.75
69. Id.
70. Petitioners' Opening Brief at 1, 6, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct.
304, 307 (1989) (No. 88-42).
71. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 844 F.2d 598, 599 (9th Cir. 1987).
72. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 307.
73. Id.
74. Petitioners' Opening Brief at 7, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct
304 (1989) (No. 88-42).
75. The appellants listed some of the events from a chronology prepared by the
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality:
10/14/80- "Informative" enforcement letter sent to county. Monitoring wells
damaged, drainage problems, excessive litter.
12/23/80- Stronger enforcement letter sent to county. Leachate overflowing
berm. Leachate system problems. Too much exposed waste. Inadequate
[Vol. 8
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B. The Holdings
1. The District Court
On April 9, 1982, the Hallstroms filed an action in federal
district court against the County pursuant to the citizen-suit
provisions of RCRA 6 The Hallstroms were seeking injunctive
relief to stop the discharge of leachate from the County's
landfill into their land. After learning that the Hallstroms
failed to notify the EPA or the DEQ of their intent to sue, the
County made a motion for summary judgment on March 1,
1983 based on the Hallstroms' violation of the notice require-
ment of section 6972(b)(1) of RCRA.7 On March 2, 1983, the
Hallstroms sent the EPA and the DEQ a copy of their original
notice of the RCRA violations that they had sent to the
County. 8
The district court denied the County's motion, finding
that the Hallstroms had cured any defect in notice by for-
mally notifying the EPA and the DEQ on March 2, 1983.19
The court found that the purpose of the notice requirement
was to give administrative agencies the opportunity to take
over the enforcement of the environmental statute from the
citizen-plaintiffs.80 Since neither the EPA nor the DEQ ex-
pressed any interest in taking action against the County, the
cover.
1/26/81- Very strong enforcement letter sent to county. Monitoring wells
damaged, leachate system problems, drainage problems, erosion problems,
too much exposed waste.
4/23/81- Permit issued for "new" landfill (current permit).
7/12/82- Notice of Violation issued to county. Monitoring wells damaged,
leachate system problems, too much exposed refuse, excessive litter.
1/03/83- Notice of Violation issued to county. Excessive litter.
3/21/83- "Informative" enforcement letter sent to county. Additional moni-
toring wells needed. Better wet months cover material needed. Leachate sys-
tem improvements needed.
Petitioners' Opening Brief at 7, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct 304 (1989)
(No. 88-42).
76. Id.
77. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 307.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 308.
1990]
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court found that dismissing the action and forcing the Hall-
stroms to refile at that stage of the case would only serve to
waste judicial resources.81
The district court tried the case and found that leachate
from the landfill operated by the County was polluting the
Hallstroms' land in violation of RCRA.8 2 The County was
given two years to take the necessary steps to contain the
leachate.83 The Hallstroms appealed the denial for injunctive
relief and the County cross-appealed from the denial of its
motion for summary judgment.84
2. The Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted cer-
tiorari to review the decision of the district court. The Court
limited its review to whether the failure by the Hallstroms to
comply with the sixty-day notice requirement of RCRA de-
prived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the case. 5 The Ninth Circuit adopted a jurisdictional inter-
pretation of the notice requirement.86 The court found that
the Hallstroms' failure to comply deprived the district court
of jurisdiction to hear the case, and remanded the case for
dismissal.8"
The Ninth Circuit noted that this was an issue of first
impression for the circuit, and that it was therefore necessary
to examine the two conflicting interpretations used by the
other circuit courts.8 8 The court found that there were two ap-
proaches used to interpret notice requirements for citizen
suits in environmental statutes.89 The Second, Third, Eighth,
and District of Columbia Circuits had adopted the pragmatic
81. Id.
82. Hallstrom, 844 F.2d at 599.
83. Id.
84. Haflstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 308. Additionally, the Hallstroms appealed their mo-
tion for an award of attorneys fees to the Ninth Circuit. Id.
85. Hallstrom, 844 F.2d at 599.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 600.
89. Id.
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approach. They interpreted the notice requirements as being
procedural and therefore subject to waiver, equitable modifi-
cation, and cure.90 "Under this approach, so long as 60 days
elapse before the district court takes action, formal compli-
ance with the terms of the requirement is not required. This
approach focuses on the role and right of the citizen in enforc-
ing federal environmental policies." 9'
However, the majority in the Ninth Circuit was per-
suaded to join the First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits and
adopted a jurisdictional approach regarding notice provisions,
making strict compliance with the requirements a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite for bringing a citizen suit.92 The court
stated, "This approach focuses on the plain language of the
statute and the policy concerns underlying the notice require-
ment. . . . [T]he jurisdictional interpretation of § 6972(b)
serves better the underlying policy aims of encouraging non-
judicial resolution of environmental conflicts. 93
In adopting the jurisdictional approach, the Ninth Circuit
majority found that:
[T]he notice requirement and its legislative history reflect
Congress's belief that the citizen-plaintiff working with
the state or the EPA can better resolve environmental
disputes than can the courts. Congress believed that citi-
zen enforcement through the courts should be secondary
to administrative enforcement by the EPA....
We will not attribute to Congress an intent to enact a
provision after hours of debate that could be evaded by
every potential plaintiff, thus rendering it meaningless.
The majority also found that Congress' intent that the notice
provision be interpreted jurisdictionally is evidenced by the
1984 amendments to the notice requirements of RCRA 5 This
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 600-01.
94. Id. at 601.
95. Id. at 600. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (1988). This provision allows an action to
begin immediately after notification has been given when the violation concerns
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addition "waives the 60-day notice requirement if the alleged
violation involves hazardous waste .... This provision makes
clear that Congress considered the 60-day notice requirement
and intended that it apply in all cases except those involving
hazardous waste."96 The Hallstrom majority also noted that a
jurisdictional interpretation would enable the government to
receive notice of environmental disputes and handle them
through nonjudicial means. The court stated, "Non-judicial
resolution of such conflicts is more likely if parties consider
their interests and positions in a nonadversarial setting before
suit is filed. '97 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the Hallstroms' failure to comply with the notice require-
ments of RCRA deprived the district court of jurisdiction to
hear the case. The Ninth Circuit therefore remanded the case
for dismissal.98
In his dissent, Justice Pregerson stated that "[bly requir-
ing dismissal, the majority exalt[ed] form over substance.""
Justice Pregerson pointed out that the EPA and the DEQ had
actual notice of the County's violations before the trial began
on July 22, 1985.100 He stated:
One of the purposes of the 60-day notice requirement is
to allow the EPA to enforce the statute .... [TIhe EPA
was well aware of the conflict between the Hallstroms and
Tillamook County. In fact, EPA personnel had called
[counsel for the Hallstroms] at various stages of the dis-
trict court action to ask how it was proceeding. At no
time did the EPA indicate any interest in enforcing the
statute; it was content to let the Hallstroms proceed with
their citizens' suit.10 1
The Hallstrom dissent also noted that most of the circuit
courts that had addressed this issue determined that the no-
RCRA hazardous waste management standards.
96. Hallstrom, 844 F.2d at 600-01.
97. Id. at 601.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 602.
101. Id.
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tice requirements for citizen suits in environmental statutes
are pragmatic and not jurisdictional.102 A pragmatic approach
only requires that sixty days lapse between the time that the
proper parties are notified and the time that the district court
can take action.103 Justice Pregerson stated:
This approach furthers the goal of agency enforcement: it
allows the agency to consider the alleged violation for 60
days. If the agency has taken no action after 60 days, the
district court may proceed. It would be "excessively for-
malistic" to require the district court to dismiss the ac-
tion and the parties to refile. 104
3. The United States Supreme Court
The Hallstroms appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari. 10 5 On appeal, counsel for the
Hallstroms again argued that the notice requirement should
be interpreted pragmatically, making it subject to waiver, eq-
uitable modification, and cure.106 Counsel compared the
RCRA notice requirement to the requirement in Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,107 that charges of Title VII viola-
tions be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission within a certain statutory period.108 The Supreme
Court found that this prefiling requirement was not a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to a Title VII action, but that it was a re-
quirement that was subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable
tolling. 09
Counsel for the Hallstroms also argued that a procedural
interpretation of the notice requirement allows for govern-
ment enforcement of RCRA while protecting the environment
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 309 (1989).
106. Id. at 309.
107. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(d), 78 Stat. 260 (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988)).
108. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 399.
109. Id. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
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and fostering citizen enforcement.110 According to this argu-
ment, whether the plaintiff waits for sixty days after notifica-
tion before filing an action, or the district court stays the pro-
ceedings for sixty days after notification has been given, the
appropriate parties are still notified and given the requisite
amount of time to act."1 '
Counsel for the County argued that the notice require-
ment must be interpreted jurisdictionally based upon the
plain language of RCRA.112 In arguing before the United
States Supreme Court, counsel for the County relied almost
entirely upon a literal interpretation of the applicable provi-
sions of RCRA."1
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and granted the
County's motion for summary judgment." 4 Justice O'Connor
delivered the majority opinion and was joined in her decision
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Blackmun,
Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy. " ' Justice Marshall was joined
in his dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan. "
The Court found the clear language of RCRA to be con-
trolling.' 17 The notice requirement was found by the Court to
be a specific limitation on a citizen's right to bring an action
under RCRA.118 The Court cited Rule 3 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and noted that an action is commenced
when a complaint is filed with the court." 9 The Court stated:
[R]eading § 6972(b)(1) in light of this rule, a plaintiff may
not file suit before fulfilling the 60-day notice require-
110. Petitioners' Opening Brief at 16, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct.
304 (1989) (No. 88-42).
111. Id. at 19-20.
112. Respondent's Brief at 7, Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304
(1989) (No. 88-42).
113. Id. at 7-14.
114. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 312 (1989).
115. Id. at 307.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 308-09.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 309.
[Vol. 8
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol8/iss1/9
HALLSTROM
ment. Staying judicial action once the suit has been filed
does not honor this prohibition. Congress could have ex-
cepted parties from complying with the notice or delay
requirement; indeed, it carved out such an exception in
its 1984 amendments to RCRA.12 0
The majority did not find the Hallstroms' comparison be-
tween the notice requirements of RCRA and the filing re-
quirements of Title VII to be persuasive."2 ' The Court held
that the filing requirement of Title VII acts as a statute of
limitations for the action, whereas under RCRA, the plaintiffs
have full control over the timing of their suit.122 The Court
stated that, "[tihe equities do not weigh in favor of modifying
statutory requirements when the procedural default is caused
by petitioners' 'failure to take the minimal steps necessary' to
preserve their claims. '1 23
In examining the legislative history of citizen suits in en-
vironmental statutes, the majority found evidence of an intent
by Congress to strike a balance between encouraging citizen
enforcement of environmental statutes and avoiding an exces-
sive number of citizen suits in the federal courts.1 2 4 "[N]otice
allows Government agencies to take responsibility for enforc-
ing environmental regulations, thus obviating the need for cit-
izen suits. . . . [N]otice [also] gives the alleged violator 'an
opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the
Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.' "125
The majority reached the conclusion that "the notice and
60-day delay requirements are mandatory conditions prece-
dent to commencing suit under the RCRA citizen suit provi-
sion; a District Court may not disregard these requirements at
its discretion." ' 6 However, the Court did not explicitly follow
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466
(1975)).
124. Id. at 310.
125. Id. (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987)).
126. Id. at 311.
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a jurisdictional interpretation. The Court held:
The parties have framed the question presented in this
case as whether the notice provision is jurisdictional or
procedural. In light of our literal interpretation of the
statutory requirement, we need not determine whether §
6972(b) is jurisdictional in the strict sense of the term.
[citation omitted] As a general rule, if an action is barred
by the terms of a statute, it must be dismissed.1 27
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan concurred,
based his dissent on the fact that "requiring district courts to
dismiss every action filed in violation of § 6972(b) ill serves
both judicial economy and Congress's purposes in adopting
RCRA ... .,"128 The dissent conceded that the applicable pro-
visions in RCRA require notice to be given before a citizen
files a complaint. 12 9 Justice Marshall stated, "The Court fails
to recognize, however, that there is no necessary connection
between a violation of that statute and any particular sanction
for noncompliance."1 30 The dissent pointed out that the Court
had found that staying proceedings is preferable to dismissal
with leave to refile.1 31 Therefore, the dissent argued that the
violation of a mandatory precondition to a citizen action does
not mandate that the action be dismissed.13 2
The dissent also found that staying the proceedings for
sixty days would serve the purposes of the notice requirement
as well as mandate dismissal and refiling for failure to com-
127. Id.
128. Id. at 312.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 313.
131. Id. (citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979)). The dissent
referred to the Court's decision in Oscar Mayer where the Court stated, "'To require
a second "filing" by the aggrieved party after termination of state proceedings would
serve no purpose other than the creation of an additional procedural technicality.
Such technicalities are particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which lay-
men, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.' " Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at
313 (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 765 n.13 (1979)) (citation
omitted).
132. Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 313.
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ply. '33 The purposes of requiring notification in citizen suits,
attempting to trigger government action and bring violators
into compliance, would also be served."" "All that is necessary
to meet these concerns is a 60-day delay; whether it comes
immediately before or immediately after the filing of the com-
plaint is immaterial.' 13
5
In addressing the legislative history behind citizen suits,
the dissent found that such provisions were enacted by Con-
gress to encourage citizens to bring suits.'36 The dissent
stated:
Where Congress intends to facilitate citizen suits, and
where the salutary purposes of the notice provision can be
served equally well by a stay as by dismissal, a regime
that requires the dismissal of a citizen suit that has "con-
sumed the time and energy of a District Court and the
parties . . ." is simply inconsistent with the will of
Congress."'
IV. Analysis
In analyzing the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Halistrom, it is important to examine the purposes
of providing for citizen suits and the effect of the Court's deci-
sion to interpret the notice requirements for citizen suits liter-
ally. In furtherance of these purposes, the requirements for
citizen actions should be pragmatically interpreted.
Citizen suits provide a means by which an individual may
protect himself and his environment. In its decision, the Su-
preme Court noted that one of the purposes of providing for
citizen suits is to trigger governmental action. 38 The citizen
suit provision is a means by which an individual is given
rights to enforce environmental statutes similar to those given
133. Id. at 314.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting the majority opinion in Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 312).
138. Hallstrom, 100 S. Ct. at 310.
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to a governmental agency.1 39 Considering the time and ex-
pense necessary to bring such an enforcement suit, most citi-
zen-plaintiffs would prefer to allow the EPA or a state agency
to bring the action. However, the government has the option
of whether to pursue the matter."1 0 If the government chooses
to do nothing and the violation continues, the citizen-plain-
tiff's only recourse is to proceed with an action himself. Ac-
cording to a literal, jurisdictional interpretation of the notice
requirements, a citizen-plaintiff would be forced to endure a
violation of an environmental regulation for sixty days, even if
the EPA and the state immediately refused to become in-
volved upon notification.
The threat of filing suit does not give a citizen-plaintiff as
much leverage against the violator as the actual filing of a
suit. Providing district courts with the flexibility and discre-
tion to stay proceedings allows time for any necessary notifi-
cation, while forcefully encouraging the violator to come into
compliance. Bringing a suit may also be a more effective
means of triggering government action in the matter than an
informal complaint to the violator. Filing a suit against a vio-
lator may encourage rectification of the violation more than a
nonadversarial threat. A pragmatic interpretation of the no-
tice requirement provides district courts with the discretion to
adjust the proceedings of an enforcement action where it is
necessary.
As the dissent noted, a pragmatic approach better serves
judicial economy."" Allowing district courts the discretion to
stay proceedings and permit a citizen-plaintiff the opportu-
nity to cure his failure to comply with the notice requirements
saves the case from having to be dismissed and refiled. Dis-
missal and refiling wastes judicial resources, especially where
a case is dismissed after reaching an advanced stage of litiga-
tion. It may also be prohibitively expensive for a citizen-plain-
tiff to refile an action. Considering the burdensome time and
expense involved in the enforcement of an environmental reg-
139. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988).
140. Id. See Hallstrom, 110 S. Ct. at 311.
141. Halistrom, 110 S. Ct. at 315.
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ulation by an individual, allowing district courts to have dis-
cretion with respect to the notice requirements would not en-
courage unnecessary litigation.
The 1984 amendments to RCRA's notice requirements
are also evidence of the need for a pragmatic interpretation of
these provisions. This addition to the statute makes it possi-
ble for an action to be filed immediately after notice is given
when the violation concerns RCRA's hazardous waste man-
agement standards. This provision shows congressional aware-
ness of the need for immediate action in certain situations.
Even in those instances where the violation does not involve a
hazardous waste, there still may be an urgent need for imme-
diate action where an individual's property or livelihood is
threatened by the violation. A pragmatic interpretation of the
notice requirement allows the district court to provide for
such situations by staying a proceeding after an action is filed.
Actually bringing an action is often a stronger enforcement
tool for an individual than the threat of a suit in the future.
V. Conclusion
Citizen suits encourage the enforcement of federal envi-
ronmental statutes. A pragmatic or procedural interpretation
of the notice requirements facilitates citizen suits.
The holding of the United States Supreme Court in Hall-
strom v. Tillamook County sets a precedent not only for citi-
zen suits brought under RCRA, but for citizen suits brought
under other environmental statutes with similar provisions.
The Court's decision to literally interpret notice requirements
for citizen suits deprives citizen-plaintiffs of the flexibility
necessary in certain circumstances, such as those where the
EPA and the state refuse to become involved in the enforce-
ment. When the plaintiff has failed to specifically comply with
the statutory provisions, forcing the dismissal and refiling of
the citizen suit does nothing to further the purposes of requir-
ing notification and is a waste of judicial resources.
A future amendment to the notice requirements, specifi-
cally providing courts with the discretion necessary to apply a
pragmatic approach, may be a more effective means of aiding
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citizen enforcement. However, until this legislation is enacted,
we are forced to take a jurisdictional approach to interpreting
notice requirements for citizen suits.
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